我深信,利用人工智能来保卫美国及其他民主国家、击败专制对手,具有关乎存亡的重要意义。
因此,Anthropic 一直积极致力于将我们的模型部署到战争部及情报界。我们是首家将模型部署到美国政府机密网络中的前沿 AI 公司,首家将模型部署到国家实验室的公司,也是首家为国家安全客户提供定制模型的公司。Claude 已广泛部署于战争部及其他国家安全机构,用于情报分析、建模与仿真、作战规划、网络行动等关键任务应用。
即便有损公司短期利益,Anthropic 也采取了行动来捍卫美国在 AI 领域的领先地位。我们选择放弃数亿美元的收入,切断与中国共产党有关联的企业(其中部分已被战争部认定为“中国军事公司”)对 Claude 的使用;我们阻止了由中共支持的、试图滥用 Claude 的网络攻击;我们还倡导对芯片实施严格的出口管制,以确保民主国家的优势。
Anthropic 深知,军事决策由战争部而非私营公司做出。我们从未对特定的军事行动提出过反对,也未试图以临时方式限制我们技术的使用。
然而,在少数情况下,我们认为 AI 可能削弱而非捍卫民主价值观。某些用途也完全超出了当前技术能够安全、可靠地实现的范围。有两类用例从未被纳入我们与战争部的合同中,我们认为现在也不应纳入。
- 大规模国内监控。我们支持将人工智能用于合法的外国情报和反间谍任务。但将这些系统用于大规模国内监控与民主价值观不相容。由人工智能驱动的大规模监控对我们的基本自由构成了严重且新颖的风险。就目前这种监控的合法性而言,仅仅是因为法律尚未跟上人工智能快速发展的能力。例如,根据现行法律,政府可以在没有获得搜查令的情况下,从公开来源购买美国人行动、网页浏览和社交关系的详细记录——情报界已承认这种做法引发了隐私担忧,并在国会引起了跨党派反对。强大的人工智能使得将这些分散、单独无害的数据自动且大规模地拼凑成任何个人生活的全面图景成为可能。
- 完全自主武器。部分自主武器——例如目前在乌克兰使用的那些——对于捍卫民主至关重要。即使是完全自主武器(即完全将人类排除在决策循环之外,并自动选择及攻击目标的武器)也可能被证明对我们的国防至关重要。但如今,前沿人工智能系统的可靠性还不足以驱动完全自主武器。我们不会故意提供将美国作战人员和平民置于风险之中的产品。我们已主动提出与战争部直接合作进行研发,以提高这些系统的可靠性,但他们尚未接受这一提议。此外,在没有适当监督的情况下,完全自主武器无法被信赖来行使我们训练有素、专业部队每天所展现的关键判断力。它们需要在适当的防护措施下部署,而这类措施目前并不存在。
据我们所知,迄今为止,这两个例外并未成为加速我们模型在武装部队内部采用和使用的障碍。
战争部已声明,在上述情况下,他们将只与同意“任何合法用途”并移除安全防护措施的AI公司签约。他们威胁称,如果我们保留这些防护措施,就将我们从其系统中移除;他们还威胁要将我们列为“供应链风险”——这一标签通常用于美国的对手,从未施加于任何美国公司——并援引《国防生产法》强制移除这些防护措施。后两项威胁本质上是自相矛盾的:一项将我们定性为安全风险,另一项则将Claude定性为国家安全所必需。
无论如何,这些威胁不会改变我们的立场:我们无法在良心上同意他们的要求。
选择最符合其愿景的承包商是战争部的特权。但考虑到Anthropic的技术为我们的武装部队提供的巨大价值,我们希望他们能重新考虑。我们强烈倾向于继续为战争部和我们的作战人员服务——同时保留我们所要求的两项安全防护措施。如果战争部选择将Anthropic移除,我们将努力促成向其他供应商的平稳过渡,避免对正在进行的军事规划、行动或其他关键任务造成任何中断。我们的模型将按照我们提出的广泛条款,在所需时间内持续可用。
我们仍随时准备继续工作,以支持美国的国家安全。
推出Claude教师版
Anthropic承诺向加拿大AI研究投入1000万美元
I believe deeply in the existential importance of using AI to defend the United States and other democracies, and to defeat our autocratic adversaries.
Anthropic has therefore worked proactively to deploy our models to the Department of War and the intelligence community. We were the first frontier AI company to deploy our models in the US government’s classified networks, the first to deploy them at the National Laboratories, and the first to provide custom models for national security customers. Claude is extensively deployed across the Department of War and other national security agencies for mission-critical applications, such as intelligence analysis, modeling and simulation, operational planning, cyber operations, and more.
Anthropic has also acted to defend America’s lead in AI, even when it is against the company’s short-term interest. We chose to forgo several hundred million dollars in revenue to cut off the use of Claude by firms linked to the Chinese Communist Party (some of whom have been designated by the Department of War as Chinese Military Companies), shut down CCP-sponsored cyberattacks that attempted to abuse Claude, and have advocated for strong export controls on chips to ensure a democratic advantage.
Anthropic understands that the Department of War, not private companies, makes military decisions. We have never raised objections to particular military operations nor attempted to limit use of our technology in an ad hoc manner.
However, in a narrow set of cases, we believe AI can undermine, rather than defend, democratic values. Some uses are also simply outside the bounds of what today’s technology can safely and reliably do. Two such use cases have never been included in our contracts with the Department of War, and we believe they should not be included now:
- Mass domestic surveillance. We support the use of AI for lawful foreign intelligence and counterintelligence missions. But using these systems for mass domestic surveillance is incompatible with democratic values. AI-driven mass surveillance presents serious, novel risks to our fundamental liberties. To the extent that such surveillance is currently legal, this is only because the law has not yet caught up with the rapidly growing capabilities of AI. For example, under current law, the government can purchase detailed records of Americans’ movements, web browsing, and associations from public sources without obtaining a warrant, a practice the Intelligence Community has acknowledged raises privacy concerns and that has generated bipartisan opposition in Congress. Powerful AI makes it possible to assemble this scattered, individually innocuous data into a comprehensive picture of any person’s life—automatically and at massive scale.
- Fully autonomous weapons. Partially autonomous weapons, like those used today in Ukraine, are vital to the defense of democracy. Even fully autonomous weapons (those that take humans out of the loop entirely and automate selecting and engaging targets) may prove critical for our national defense. But today, frontier AI systems are simply not reliable enough to power fully autonomous weapons. We will not knowingly provide a product that puts America’s warfighters and civilians at risk. We have offered to work directly with the Department of War on R&D to improve the reliability of these systems, but they have not accepted this offer. In addition, without proper oversight, fully autonomous weapons cannot be relied upon to exercise the critical judgment that our highly trained, professional troops exhibit every day. They need to be deployed with proper guardrails, which don’t exist today.
To our knowledge, these two exceptions have not been a barrier to accelerating the adoption and use of our models within our armed forces to date.
The Department of War has stated they will only contract with AI companies who accede to “any lawful use” and remove safeguards in the cases mentioned above. They have threatened to remove us from their systems if we maintain these safeguards; they have also threatened to designate us a “supply chain risk”—a label reserved for US adversaries, never before applied to an American company—and to invoke the Defense Production Act to force the safeguards’ removal. These latter two threats are inherently contradictory: one labels us a security risk; the other labels Claude as essential to national security.
Regardless, these threats do not change our position: we cannot in good conscience accede to their request.
It is the Department’s prerogative to select contractors most aligned with their vision. But given the substantial value that Anthropic’s technology provides to our armed forces, we hope they reconsider. Our strong preference is to continue to serve the Department and our warfighters—with our two requested safeguards in place. Should the Department choose to offboard Anthropic, we will work to enable a smooth transition to another provider, avoiding any disruption to ongoing military planning, operations, or other critical missions. Our models will be available on the expansive terms we have proposed for as long as required.
We remain ready to continue our work to support the national security of the United States.