# 在伊朗战争中，AI 似乎助力了作战行动，而非战略决策

- 来源：Gary Marcus：The Road to AI We Can Trust（RSS）
- 作者：Gary Marcus
- 发布时间：2026-04-01 09:27
- AIHOT 链接：https://aihot.virxact.com/items/cmnxjn4xh003qsl9o0qpdbja1
- 原文链接：https://garymarcus.substack.com/p/in-the-iran-war-it-looks-like-ai

## AI 摘要

针对伊朗冲突中人工智能应用的最新分析指出，当前军事 AI 主要作用于战术层面的作战行动优化，包括目标识别与情报处理等具体环节，尚未介入战争的整体战略规划与决策制定。这种技术部署模式揭示了现阶段 AI 在军事领域的应用边界——虽能提升操作效率，但距离自主决定战争走向仍有显著差距。

## 正文

Overheard, from a career diplomat whose country is not one of the key participants in the US-Iran conflict, paraphrased (probably imperfectly) from memory:

This has been a war filled with mistakes. The US underestimated Iran’s resilience, overestimated the chances of regime change, and failed to anticipate Iran’s countermoves.

Yet presumably the US made use of AI in its strategy. It looks like AI helped with operations, but was not good on strategy.

Why should this be? I see at least three reasons off the top of my head, all of which should have been obvious before the bombs were dropped.

First, strategy, more than e.g., writing requisition memos, requires a broad, deep understanding of the world, but generative AI has never had robust models of the world.

Second, strategy (especially in a situation like this) demands an ability to project beyond past data, and into new situations. Generative AI has never been very good at that.

Third, there is the well-known tendency of generative AI to be sycophantic; to tell users that their ideas were the greatest ever, even when they are not. It’s not altogether difficult to imagine certain members of the senior leadership at the Department of War succumbing to that.

AI is fine for writing memos; nobody should rely on it to plan a war or to guess its likely outcomes.

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