上周,我有幸在首尔举行的国际机器学习大会上发表了题为“未来还有什么留给我们去做?”的主题演讲。我谈到了随着人工智能能力增强,我们应如何适应这一普遍存在的焦虑。演讲反响热烈,令我备受鼓舞,因此我将幻灯片在此公开,并附上了经过轻微编辑的讲稿注释。您也可以在本页面下方直接查看,但在线版本包含动画、可点击链接,整体体验更佳。
我提出了三个论点。首先,“AI 作为普通技术”框架是思考 AI 影响的一种正确且有用的方式,除非未来出现某种不连续性,例如通过递归式自我改进。其次,尽管我们应认真对待递归式自我改进,但公司在实验室中可能取得的任何里程碑都不会突然让我们所有人都失业。第三,也是最后一点,未来的工作将发生根本性变化,需要大量的适应。我分享了自己对此可能形态的思考,并以人类与 AI “共同超级智能”的愿景作为结尾。
当前,AI 领域既令人无比兴奋,也令 AI 社群深感焦虑。我想直面这种焦虑。我们该如何为这样一个未来做准备——届时 AI 将能够完成越来越多我们今天所做的工作?
我在普林斯顿大学领导一个团队,致力于推进 AI 智能体评估的科学。我们试图超越那些常见的“看,能力在基准测试上提升了!”的说法。这些说法往往被公众误解,暗示智能体很快将取代我们所有的工作。
也许这会发生。但在我们的工作中,我们试图理解除能力之外,对实际部署至关重要的因素,并将这种理解融入评估之中。
我更广为人知的工作,是我与 Sayash Kapoor 合著的文章《AI 作为普通技术》。这是一种思考 AI 中期未来以及如何适应它——进而如何使其适应社会和经济需求——的方式。
我们一直在四处撰写文章,讨论律师应该如何适应,或者记者应该如何适应。但颇具讽刺意味的是,如何适应这个问题,首先冲击的却是我们自己的社区。无论是软件工程还是AI研究本身,AI在这些领域的能力当然正在飞速发展。
我们对此刻的回应,其意义远不止于这个社区。全世界都在看着。如果我们只是简单地屈服,接受未来我们的大量工作将由AI完成,而不是设定明确的界限,我认为这将导致比我们今天看到的更强烈的、针对AI的政治反弹。所以我认为这个问题不仅关乎我们,也关乎整个世界。
从AI诞生之初,历史上就一直存在着两种相互角力的叙事。过去,这种分歧是学术性和哲学性的,但现在它已经变成了一个非常实际的问题。我们每个人都必须决定自己属于哪个阵营,或者处于这个光谱上的哪个位置,因为相信其中一种叙事与相信另一种叙事所带来的实际后果,是截然不同的。
如果你认为这是一项几年后就能取代我们今天所做一切的技术,那么正确的应对方式或许就是在我们的技能变得无关紧要之前,尽快积累财富。而这也是硅谷许多人选择的道路。你可能听说过“永久底层阶级”这个说法。
另一方面,如果你像我一样相信,这是一项将极大增强我们潜力的技术,那么现在就是培养技能的最佳时机——尤其是那些能够与AI正在做以及将要做到的事情形成互补的技能——同时也要构建围绕它的所有东西,比如自主性、品味和判断力。
如果你选择了第一条路,而事实证明AI最终是一种增强型技术,而非替代型技术,那么我认为,在接下来的几年里,你或许就错失了历史上最好的时机,去培养那些能赋予我们超能力的技能。这就是为什么我们都需要思考这个问题,即使我们最终不会得出相同的结论。
将人工智能视为正常技术,是我今天演讲的智识框架。当我们说 AI 是正常的,并不意味着它就像一把锤子或一支牙刷那样,是一种平淡无奇的技术。
我们在文章中明确承认,这是一项具有工业革命规模意义的变革性技术。我们并非 AI 怀疑论者。
这不是一句口号。它是一个框架——一种关于 AI 能力如何影响经济与社会的因果模型。这是一篇一万五千字的文章,我们正在将其扩展成书。我提到这一点,是因为人们常常听到“正常”这个词,就以为理解了我们的意思,但这往往会导致误解。
首先,我将论证,除非未来出现某种不连续性——例如通过递归式自我改进——导致未来影响与过去影响截然不同,否则这个框架作为思考 AI 影响的方式,是正确且有用的。
其次,我将讨论,尽管我们应该认真对待递归式自我改进,但我个人并不会为此过度焦虑。
第三点,也是最后一点,我想明确表示,我并非在说未来的工作会与现在的工作一模一样。未来需要大量的适应调整。因此,我想就我认为我们的角色将如何变化,以及我们如何最好地适应这些变化,提供一些初步的思考。
过去那些强大的技术,比如电力,已经得到了深入研究,我们拥有成熟的框架来理解技术进步如何带来经济影响。
发明:发现电磁学原理、交流电与直流电的区别等。
创新:人们并不直接“使用”电力。我们使用的是电器。这些电器需要被发明出来,因此这是一种下游创新——这是该框架的第二阶段。
扩散:这指的是人们开始采纳创新的渐进过程。
在我们的文章中,我们将这一框架应用于 AI,并将其充实为一个四部分框架。
以下是一个基本图景,以软件工程为例进行说明。方法/能力:模型正在快速进步。产品/应用:我们并不直接使用大语言模型。它们之所以对我们所有工作产生如此深远的影响,是因为编码智能体。这些产品将那些潜在能力转化为对工作者有用且可用的工具。早期采用:起初人们大多在尝试氛围编程,而现在我们知道这并非开发生产级软件的最佳方式——因此我们有了更复杂的方法来进行智能体工程。适应(或结构性转型)——这是第四个也是最缓慢的阶段。我今天演讲的大部分内容都将围绕这一点展开。我认为这一阶段需要数十年时间。它实际上尚未真正开始,即使在软件工程这类相对较早采用编码智能体的领域也是如此。
我们不知道适应阶段会是什么样子——只能推测。请允许我稍作推测。如果未来编码智能体能够创建千万行级别的代码库,且没有大量错误和安全漏洞,那么为数十亿人开发同一款软件就意义不大了。更有意义的是让软件能够针对每个个体或团队的需求进行定制。这就是我所说的极端个性化。
这不仅仅是技术变革——也是行业变革。例如:我们还需要软件公司吗?也许软件开发将大规模转向内部,由实际使用软件的团队和公司自行完成。再次强调,这只是推测,但关键在于,正是这种组织变革、人类变革——非常缓慢,需要数十年时间——才能让我们充分发挥AI的全部潜力,无论是在软件工程还是任何其他领域。这就是这篇文章的核心洞见之一。回顾过去的技术变革,这种变化往往非常缓慢。
在电力出现之前,工厂通常看起来像左图那样。一台巨大的蒸汽机产生动力,再通过机械齿轮和皮带传送到整个工厂。所以当电力来临时,工厂主试图用发电机取代那些蒸汽锅炉。他们认为这样会高效得多。但这种直接替换的想法并没有奏效。如今我们在谈论 AI 智能体时经常听到这个词——说它们将直接替代人类工人。这在电力的案例中并没有成功。
真正奏效、并且花了 40 年才发展出来的做法,是认识到电力是一种截然不同的技术。它是可移动的,所以你可以把动力输送到任何需要的地方。这让你能够围绕流水线的逻辑重新组织整个工厂的布局。而这需要改变工人的培训、雇佣和解雇方式,制定新的劳动法,等等。这就是工厂为了从电力中获益所必须进行的组织适应过程。
我们认为,这就是我们将为 AI 经历的过程。几十年后,我们将从根本上重新组织工作方式。我们不知道那会是什么样子,这正是我们所有人面临的挑战。而这不仅仅是 AI 公司的工作,就像弄清楚工厂应该如何重组并不是电力公司的工作一样。在我们看来,这是 AI 对经济产生影响的四个阶段中最慢的一个。如今,这个过程实际上还没有开始。
为什么不同职业的人本可以用 AI 做的事情与他们实际用 AI 做的事情之间存在巨大差距?一个原因可能是人们接受技术很慢,这当然是我们框架的一部分。
但我们想知道,也许那些正在部署 AI 却没有取得多大成功的人,了解一些 AI 行业所不了解的 AI 实际局限性。让我们对能力与部署之间的关系多一些谦逊。
鉴于人们最常提到的担忧是可靠性,我们试图衡量,与能力相区别的可靠性,是否构成了阻碍 AI 智能体实际应用的一道门槛。
我们考察了 10 到 12 项可靠性指标,并将其归纳为四个维度。一致性:假设我们听说某个 AI 智能体的准确率为 70%。这是否意味着它能在 70% 的任务上正常工作,并且对于它能处理的任务,每次都能成功完成?从部署角度来看,这很棒——你可以将它部署在那部分任务上。还是说,这意味着对于任何给定的任务,它都可能以 30% 的概率不可预测地失败?从部署角度来看,这几乎毫无用处。也许令人震惊的是,我们考察的所有智能体基准测试都没有区分这两种情况。两者都被表示为 70% 的准确率。鲁棒性:我们考察了鲁棒性:当环境发生微小变化时会发生什么?校准:智能体能否回顾自己的运行记录,判断自己是否正确地执行了任务?操作安全性:当它失败时,是可恢复的,还是会像删除生产数据库那样造成严重后果?
对于人类工作者来说,如果我们认为某个人能胜任某项工作,指的是所有这些方面,而不仅仅是准确率。但事实证明,我们之前只根据准确率来衡量智能体。
我们使用两个互补的基准测试,对过去大约 24 个月内发布的、来自这三家前沿 AI 公司的模型,衡量了它们的能力和可靠性。
在此期间,准确率或能力急剧上升(左图)。
但可靠性(右图)仅提升了五到十个百分点。
这其中有很多潜在影响,但我想重点强调一点。目前,行业并没有将自动化智能体和协作智能体区分对待。如果你以无头模式运行一个智能体,我猜它就成了自动化智能体。这种看法并不妥当,因为对于自动化智能体至关重要的可靠性等特性,实际上可能会妨碍协作智能体——比如你用来改进创意写作或类似任务的智能体。对于那种智能体,你不希望它每次都像机器人一样重复同样的操作。你希望它富有创造力,探索不同的可能性,并且不可预测。
无论是智能体的框架,还是模型的后训练阶段,都应根据其驱动的是协作智能体还是自动化智能体而有所区别。
我希望随着时间的推移,可靠性会持续提升,自动化也会变得更容易。但目前来看,我认为协作智能体仍将取得更大的成功。许多仓促使用智能体来自动化业务流程的公司,已经意识到了其中的局限性、成本,甚至法律风险——比如当智能体删除了生产数据时。
就目前而言,智能体只能同时具备以下三个属性中的两个:通用性(基于语言模型的智能体,可以被指示执行不同任务,而非像传统软件那样专为单一任务构建);部署在高风险场景中;以及自动化。
这也是我认为,目前人工智能更像是一种协作技术,而非取代工人的自动化技术的原因之一。
我们以软件工程为例。这是一个很好的领先指标,因为编程智能体的采用速度尤其快。
你可能会想:好吧,我们无法完全自动化软件工程。但如果智能体让软件工程师的生产力提升十倍,那么我们需要的软件工程师数量就会减少十倍。这难道不是一个显而易见的推论吗?
嗯,这与数据完全矛盾。我们在后续的一篇文章中对此进行了研究。在我们考察的每一个案例中,公司都面临着财务压力,而将裁员归咎于人工智能显然更为方便。
为什么人工智能至今仍未取代软件工程师?我们早就知道——这是2019年的一篇论文——编写代码其实并非瓶颈所在。
过去一年里,随着软件工程师开始采用编码智能体,并逐渐意识到这似乎并未减少他们的工作量,许多博客文章重新发现了这样一个事实:编写代码并非瓶颈。以下是一些例子。
那么,真正的瓶颈到底是什么?
这个框架就是我们对这个问题的回答。
决策层:理解客户需求、制定规格说明、规划等。这部分并未因人工智能而压缩。
执行层:实际的编码和调试。这部分正在被压缩,但它最初可能只占全部工作的大约三分之一。
交付层:足够深入地理解你的代码,以便对你发布的内容负责;执行与客户系统的集成、维护、测试等。这一层同样没有被压缩。
事实上,随着人工智能压缩中间层,第一层和第三层反而在扩大——我稍后会回到这一点。
我认为在软件工程领域已经是这样,并且未来在许多职业中也会越来越普遍:我们可以将知识工作者类比为起重机操作员或叉车操作员。机器极大地放大了人类从事体力劳动的潜力——它承担了所有繁重的工作,但人仍然掌握着控制权。我认为这正是认知工作中正在发生的事情。机器将越来越多地承担认知方面的繁重工作,但人仍然掌握着控制权。
整个工作的概念被重新定义为:操作机器、理解机器和控制机器,而不是由我们自己来完成认知工作。
这一切看似剧变,但从某种意义上说,它只是软件工程领域反复上演的进程的延续。从机器码时代开始,我们经历了多波技术浪潮,每一波都让生产力提升近一个数量级。而软件工程师的需求非但没有减少,在我们沿着这个阶梯攀升的过程中,软件工程领域的就业人数反而增长了大约一万倍。原因很简单:需要编写的代码量已经提升了数个数量级。
经济学家反复发现这一现象。你可能听说过"杰文斯悖论"这个术语;我更喜欢"劳动总量谬误"这个说法。
自动取款机让银行开设大量地区分行在经济上变得可行。而这些分行仍然需要人类柜员来处理自动取款机无法完成的事务。因此,矛盾的是,就业岗位实际上增加了。
杰弗里·辛顿十年前曾做出著名预测:放射科医生将在五年内基本消失。但事实证明,放射科的就业人数实际上增长了。这并非因为放射科医生拒绝接受AI,他们实际上正在热情地采用它。就业增长的一个原因是:当某项任务执行起来更快、成本更低时,对其需求就会增加。
我们撰写了一篇论文,探讨律师应如何适应。其中内容很多,但一个简单的观点是:AI让提起诉讼变得容易得多。这意味着律师的工作量会增加。如果我们不喜欢生活在一个好讼的社会里,可能会对此感到不满,但从律师就业的角度来看,这是个好消息。
翻译是一个更极端的例子,让我感到震惊。AI在近十年前就已达到接近人类的水平。然而,人类译员的就业人数基本保持稳定,并且预计在未来十年内仍将保持稳定。原因有很多,但其中之一是:可以翻译的内容以及可以翻译成的语言种类,实际上没有上限。
I had the honor of giving a keynote at the International Conference on Machine Learning in Seoul last week titled “What will be left for us to work on?” I addressed the widespread anxiety about how we should adapt as AI capabilities increase. I was thrilled by the talk’s reception, so I have made my slides available here, annotated with a lightly edited transcript. You can also view them below right here on this page, but the online version has animations, clickable links, and a much nicer experience overall.
I made three arguments. First, the AI as Normal Technology framework is a correct and useful as a way to think about AI’s impacts, unless and until there is some future discontinuity such as through recursive self-improvement. Second, even though we should take recursive self-improvement seriously, there is no milestone that companies might achieve in the lab that will suddenly put us all out of work. Third and finally, jobs of the future will be radically different, and a lot of adaptation will be needed. I shared my thinking about what this might look like and ended with a vision of human/AI “co-superintelligence”.
Now is a time of great excitement in AI, but it’s also a time of great anxiety in the AI community. I want to address that anxiety head on. How do we prepare for a future where AI will become capable of doing more and more of the work that we do today?
I lead a team at Princeton University trying to advance the science of AI agent evaluation. We try to go beyond the usual claims of “Look, capability is going up on benchmarks!” Those claims tend to be misinterpreted by the broader public as implying that agents are soon about to take all our jobs.
Maybe that will happen. But in our work we try to understand the factors beyond capability that matter for real-world deployment, and bring that understanding into evaluations.
The work that I’m better known for is the essay I co-authored with Sayash Kapoor called AI as Normal Technology. It’s a way to think about the medium-term future of AI and how to adapt to it — and in turn how to adapt it to the needs of society and the economy.
So we’ve been going around writing these essays about how lawyers should adapt, or maybe how journalists should adapt. But perhaps ironically, the question of how to adapt has been hitting our community first. Whether it’s software engineering or AI research itself, AI capabilities in these areas are of course advancing very rapidly.
Our response to this moment matters beyond this community. The whole world is watching. If we simply roll over and accept that a lot of our work will be done by AI in the future, instead of setting clear boundaries, I think it will lead to an even stronger political backlash against AI than what we are seeing today. So I think this question is not just for us but for the whole world.
From the beginning of AI, historically there have been these two battling narratives. In the past, the distinction was academic and philosophical, but now it has become an acutely practical question. Each one of us has to decide which camp we’re in, or where on this spectrum we’re in, because the practical consequences of believing in one versus the other are very, very different.
If you think this is a technology which in a few years is going to be able to replace everything we do today, then perhaps the correct response is to build wealth as quickly as possible before our skills become irrelevant. And this is the path that many have chosen in Silicon Valley. You may have heard of the “permanent underclass” meme.
On the other hand, if you believe, as I do, that this is a technology that will greatly amplify our potential, then now is the best time to build skills — especially the skills that are going to be complementary to what AI is doing and is going to be able to do — as well as to build all the things around it, such as agency and taste and judgment.
If you choose the first path, and it turns out that AI actually ends up being an amplifying technology as opposed to a replacing technology, then I would argue that over the next few years you’ve perhaps lost the best time in history to build these skills that will give us superpowers. That’s why we all need to think about this question, even if we won’t all land in the same place.
AI as Normal Technology is the intellectual framework for my talk today. When we say AI is normal, we don’t mean that it’s just like a hammer or a toothbrush, some kind of mundane technology.
We acknowledge prominently in the essay that this is a transformative technology on the scale of the industrial revolution. We’re not AI skeptics.
This is not a slogan. It’s a framework — sort of a causal model how AI capabilities impact the economy and society. It’s a 15,000-word essay and we’re turning it into a book. And I mention that because people often hear the word normal and they assume they know what we mean, but that leads to misunderstandings.
First, I’ll argue that this framework is correct and useful as a way to think about AI’s impacts, unless and until there is some future discontinuity — such as through recursive self-improvement — that leads to future impacts looking very different from past impacts.
Second, I will talk about why, even though we should take recursive self-improvement seriously, I’m not particularly losing sleep over it.
Third and finally, I want to be clear that I’m not saying that jobs of the future will be just like jobs of the present. A lot of adaptation will be needed. So I want to give some preliminary thinking on how I think our roles are going to change and how we can best adapt to the changes.
Powerful technologies of the past, like electricity, have been thoroughly studied, and we have good frameworks to understand how technological progress leads to economic impacts.
Invention: discovering the principles of electromagnetism, AC versus DC, etc.
Innovation: People don’t use “electricity” directly. We use electrical appliances. Those had to be invented, so that is a kind of downstream innovation — that’s the second phase of the framework.
Diffusion: This refers to the gradual process by which people start adopting innovations.
In our essay we apply this framework to AI and flesh it out into a four-part framework.
Here’s the basic picture, illustrated with software engineering as an example.
Methods/capabilities: Models are rapidly improving.
Products/applications: We don’t use LLMs directly. The reason they’ve been so influential in all of our work is because of coding agents. These are products that take those latent capabilities and turn them into something useful and usable for workers.
Early adoption: At first people were mostly trying vibe coding, and now we know that that’s not really the best way to develop production software — so now we have more sophisticated ways of doing agentic engineering.
Adaptation: (or structural transformation) — the fourth and slowest phase. Much of my talk today is going to be about that. I claim that this stage takes decades. It has not really started yet, even in a field like software engineering, which is a relative early adopter of coding agents.
We don’t know what the adaptation phase will look like — we can only speculate. Permit me to speculate for a minute. If it’s going to be the case that coding agents are going to be able to create ten-million-line code bases in the future that are not full of bugs and security vulnerabilities, then it won’t make a lot of sense for us to create one piece of software that billions of people should use. It’ll make a lot more sense for software to be tailored to the needs of each individual or team. And that’s what I mean by extreme personalization.
It’s not merely a technological change — that’s also a change for the industry. For instance: do we even need software companies anymore? Maybe software development will massively shift in-house, into the companies and teams that are actually using the software. Again, this is speculation, but the point is that it is this kind of organizational change, human change — that’s very slow, that takes decades — that will allow us to take advantage of the full potential of AI, whether it’s in software engineering or in any other field. So that’s one of the central insights of the essay. When we look at past technologies, this kind of change tends to be very slow.
Before electricity, factories used to look like the picture on the left. A massive steam engine generated power and it was moved throughout the factory by mechanical gears and belts. So when electricity came along, factory owners tried to replace those steam boilers with electric generators. They thought it would be much more efficient. But this idea of a drop-in replacement did not work. We keep hearing that term in the context of AI agents today — that they will be drop-in replacements for human workers. That did not work in the case of electricity.
What actually worked, and what took 40 years to develop, is to recognize that electricity is a very different technology. It’s portable, so you can move the power to wherever you need it. That lets you reorganize the entire layout of the factory around the logic of the assembly line. And that required changing the way that workers are trained, hired, and fired, new labor laws, and so forth. So that’s the kind of organizational adaptation that it took in order to reap the benefits of electricity in factories.
Our claim is that this is the kind of process that we will go through for AI. A couple of decades from now, we will have fundamentally reorganized work. We don’t know what that’s going to look like, and that is the challenge in front of all of us. And that’s not just a job for the AI companies to do, much like it wasn’t the job of the electric utility to figure out how factories should be reorganized. In our view, this is the slowest of the four stages through which AI leads to economic impacts. Today, this process has not really gotten started.
Why is there a huge gap between what people in various occupations could be using AI for and what they’re actually using it for? One reason could be that people are slow to adopt technology, and that’s certainly part of our framework.
But we wondered if maybe the people who are deploying AI and are not having much success at it know something about the practical limitations of AI that the AI industry doesn’t. Let’s have a bit more humility about the relationship between capabilities and deployment.
Given that the #1 concern people cite is reliability, we wanted to try to measure whether reliability, distinct from capability, is a barrier to the practical usefulness of AI agents.
We looked at 10-12 reliability metrics and clustered them into four dimensions.
Consistency: Suppose we hear that an AI agent has a 70% accuracy. Does this mean it works on 70% of the tasks, but on the ones that it does, it does so every time? That’s great for deployment — you can deploy it on that subset of the tasks. Or does it mean that on any given task it might unpredictably fail with a 30% probability? That’s pretty useless from a deployment perspective. Perhaps shockingly, none of the agent benchmarks that we looked into make a distinction between these two. Both of these are represented as 70% accuracy.
Robustness: We looked at robustness: what happens when the environment changes a little bit?
Calibration: Can the agent look back at its transcript and tell if it performed the task correctly?
Operational safety: When it does fail, is it recoverable, or is it something like deleting the production database?
For a human worker, if we think of someone as being competent at a job, it’s all of these things, not just accuracy. But it turns out we were measuring agents only on accuracy.
We measured capability and reliability using two complementary benchmarks, for models from these 3 frontier AI companies that were released over the last 24 months or so.
This is a period during which accuracy or capability shot up dramatically (left).
But reliability (right) only increased by five or ten percentage points.
There are a bunch of implications but let me highlight one. Right now the industry is not treating automation and collaboration agents differently. If you run an agent in headless mode, I guess that becomes an automation agent. That is not a good way to look at it, because properties like reliability that are very important for automation agents can actually be a hindrance for a collaboration agent that you might be using to improve your creative writing or something like that. For that kind of agent, you don’t want it to behave like a robot that does the same thing every time. You want it to be creative and explore different possibilities and be unpredictable.
Scaffolds and even the post-training of models should be different based on whether it is supposed to be driving a collaboration agent or an automation agent.
My hope is that reliability will continue to improve and automation will become easier over time. But for now I think collaboration agents will continue to be much more successful. Many companies that hastily rushed to automate business processes using agents are recognizing the limits and costs, and even legal liabilities — like when an agent deletes production data.
For the time being, you can have only two out of these three properties in agents: general-purpose (a language model based agent that can be instructed to do different tasks rather than purpose-built for a task like traditional software); deployed in high-stakes scenarios, and automated.
This is one of the reasons that I think that for now, AI remains much more of a collaboration technology than a technology that automates workers away.
Let’s take software engineering as a case study. It’s a good leading indicator because coding agents have been particularly rapidly adopted.
You might think: okay, we can’t completely automate away software engineering. But if agents make software engineers ten times more productive, then we need ten times fewer software engineers. Isn’t that an obvious consequence?
Well, that is completely contradicted by the data. We looked at this in a follow-up essay. In every case we looked at, the company was under financial pressure, and it turns out to be more convenient to blame AI for the layoffs instead.
Why is AI not replacing software engineers so far? We’ve known for a while — this is a paper from 2019 — that writing code is not really the bottleneck.
Over the last year, as software engineers started adopting coding agents and started to recognize that it doesn’t seem to be cutting down on the amount of their work, there have been many blog posts rediscovering the fact that writing code is not a bottleneck. Here is a small sample.
So what actually is the bottleneck?
This framework is our answer to the question.
The decide layer: understanding customer requirements, developing the specification, planning, etc. That is not getting compressed by AI.
The execute layer: the actual coding and debugging. This is getting compressed, but it was only maybe one-third of the work to begin with.
The deliver layer: Understanding your code deeply enough to be accountable for what you release; carrying out integration into customer systems, maintenance, testing, etc. This layer is not getting compressed either.
In fact, the first and third layers are arguably expanding as AI compresses the middle layer — and I’ll come back to that point.
I think it is already the case in software engineering, and will increasingly be the case in many professions, that we can think of knowledge workers as similar to a crane operator or a forklift operator. The machine greatly amplifies the human potential to do physical work — it’s doing all the heavy lifting, but the person still remains in control. And I think this is what is happening with cognitive work. Machines are going to increasingly do the cognitive heavy lifting, but the person still remains in control.
The entire job gets reconceptualized as being about operating the machine, understanding the machine, and controlling the machine, as opposed to doing the cognitive work ourselves.
All this might seem like a dramatic change, but in a sense it is only a continuation of what has been happening over and over and over in software engineering. Starting from the days of machine code, we’ve had many waves of technology, each of which gives us nearly an order of magnitude increase in productivity. And far from decreasing the demand for software engineers, during the time that we’ve climbed up this ladder, the amount of software engineering employment has increased by a factor of something like 10,000. And that’s simply because the amount of code that there is to write has gone up by orders and orders of magnitude.
Economists have found this repeatedly. You might have heard the term Jevons’ paradox; I like the term “lump-of-labor fallacy”.
ATMs made it economically feasible for banks to open lots of regional branches. And those branches still needed human tellers to handle the things ATMs couldn’t. So, paradoxically, employment actually grew.
Geoff Hinton made the famous prediction a decade ago that radiologists would be basically extinct in five years. But it turns out radiology employment has in fact grown. And it’s not because radiologists are rejecting AI. They are actually enthusiastically adopting it. One reason for job growth is that when a task gets faster and cheaper to perform, there’s more demand for it.
We’ve written a paper looking at how lawyers should adapt. There’s a lot in there, but one simple point is that AI has made it a lot easier to file lawsuits. And this means more work for lawyers. We might be unhappy about this if we don’t like living in a litigious society, but from the point of view of employment for lawyers, this is great news.
Translation is a more extreme example which kind of blows my mind. AI was almost at human parity nearly a decade ago. Yet the employment of human translators has remained more or less stable, and is projected to remain stable over the next decade. There are many reasons for that, but one reason is that there’s really no ceiling to the amount of things you can translate and the number of different languages you can translate them into.